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BOOK NOTICE
Because We Love You
Rosemary B. Quigley

NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP. By Linda K. Kerber. New York: Hill
and Wang. 1998. Pp. :xxiv, 405. $25.
I remember the impotence I felt on the eve of the Gulf War in
January 1991. No one could have known at that moment what a brief
conflict it would be. We had every reason to believe that the Middle
East would be hurled into turmoil. And if protracted war ensued, a
draft would surely follow. I watched my college boyfriend sink into
despair, with the help of a Bob Mould CD, at the prospect of being
called to give his life for his country. I remained uncharacteristically
mute. In the face of this battle, our positions were too unequal for my
words or touch to console. I had listened to my male friends deliber
ate the legitimacy of the war-to-be and the potential for service de
ferment for some days. Though they were liberal-minded, it was clear
that my views brought little to bear upon the situation. We were all
people with big plans, but the plans of the women were shielded from
the looming threat of life-threatening, wartime service. The potential
of a male friend being killed, I was reminded, was nothing in the face
of that man conceiving his own death.
Experiencing such a dynamic compelled me to accept gradually the
different situations of men and women in American society and under
American law. Men and women used to be similarly situated to me
and I was befuddled by, and unsympathetic to, many women's seem
ing incapacity to assert themselves and achieve their goals in a pur
portedly male-defined world. But as I've worked in a professional
climate of bravado, developed intimate relationships with men, and
provided legal services to hurting women, I have come to recognize
that the genders probably are distinct, and that the best we can hope
for is harmonization. No Constitutional Right to be Ladies by Linda
Kerber1 has further clarified my resolution of the age-old conundrum
of whether women can be equal with, while distinct from, men.
Kerber draws women as strong but different, ultimately resolving that
the unique characteristics of gender should not be manipulated to un1. May Brodbeck Professor of History, University of Iowa.
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dermine social equality. Women, she points out, have sought to con
tribute equally as citizens regardless of gender differences. Kerber
sees the remaining barriers to parity, like women's exception from
conscription, as enduring from generation to generation. But by fo
cusing on women's assumption of constitutional obligations, Kerber
renders an engaging historical framework for considering women as
full partners in citizenship.
The book is a rich weaving of stories - legal tales and personal ac
counts - that Kerber says was born the morning she saw her husband
off to service in Vietnam, a duty not required of her (p. xix). Kerber's
mission is to collect narratives that demonstrate the obligations and,
where appropriate, the corresponding rights women have sought to
vindicate in the history of our country. She identifies the obligations
that women were "saved" from, and shows how these omissions sub
sequently denied women their concomitant rights. Adhering strictly
to the necessary coexistence of right and obligation, Kerber makes a
laundry list of historical exclusions that deprived women of equal citi
zenship. Some of the obligations she implicates include taxation, jury
duty, and military service. The companion rights include voting, fair
trial, and opportunity in employment. Several of these areas are not
facially gender-sensitive and so their special legal implications for
women were not always acknowledged. Kerber charts the triumphs of
women over time, representing eras from post-Revolutionary War to
post-Equal Rights Amendment. She pays particular attention to the
difference in standing between single women versus married women,
and white women versus women of color.
Beyond the eloquence of her creative nonfiction, Kerber's histori
cal analysis of women's position as participating citizens, complete
with extensive supporting notes, enriches her accounts. She provides
generous context for the time and place of a given woman's struggle.
Moreover, Kerber tells her tales from multiple viewpoints, often de
scribing the individual woman oppressed in a given situation along
with the attorneys who took her cause to the courts. In this way,
Kerber identifies a novel hall of heroes to the feminist cause, including
such luminaries as Jane Kenyon and Ruth B ader Ginsburg.
It seems important to Kerber that she be a historian and not a
feminist.2 Her accounts are true to the details of legal clashes and
their social contexts, though sometimes developing the story while dis
carding the technicalities. But Kerber is also engaged in a classically
feminist experiential project,3 giving voice to women who fulfilled civic
2. In an example of Kerber's method - documenting reality but reserving commentary
- she writes, "And even if, having considered the situation, a majority of women should
conclude that they do indeed want to be 'ladies' and to collect the 'wages of gender,' as a
historian I can only reply that those wages are not there to collect." P. 309 (emphasis
added).
3. See Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 621 (1990).

1824

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1822

obligations throughout history. She identifies the seeds of gender
stereotype planted throughout our nation's history and suggests how
these misconceptions persist today. Most vitally, Kerber's work cre
ates a duty-bound obligation to confront important questions about
gender and legal status. To what extent do women want to be viewed
as different under the law? And to what extent can they afford to be
viewed as different under the law? In claiming equality, women for
feit some of the comforts historically afforded their gender. Some
women may have relished the claimed exemption from jury service
simply based upon their sex. But feminists fought for cross-sectional
representation on juries, and so women, like men, are now obliged to
serve. Similarly, many women may find some relief in knowing they
cannot be drafted. But is the price of losing voice when national secu
rity is threatened too high?
Most of all, Kerber's stories demonstrate how alone the champions
of equal rights for women have been in their personal fights. The fact
that women continue to have personal anxiety about identifying them
selves as feminists evidences an ongoing difficulty with women's ca
pacity to coalesce as a group, if indeed they should. Women have yet
to escape from under burdens of gender stereotypes, and they have
yet to fulfill all obligations of citizenship equally. As the book's anec
dotes admonish, a first step in achieving this end is for male leaders to
abandon their vulnerable image of women. As one judge put it, "It
does not suffice under the Constitution to treat women kindly because
we love them."4
PROTECTING WOMEN FROM DUTY
Women's citizenship has been distinguished from men's citizenship
throughout our constitutional history. Women's citizenship is defined
by their relation to men, while men are stand-alone citizens. In some
states, only single women were given the franchise because they con
tinued to possess wills of their own (p. 33). Once women married,
their husbands became responsible for their actions, even crimes they
committed and contracts into which they entered (often illegally) (p.
14). Kerber tells the story of a young wife who obediently followed
her British husband out of America during the Revolutionary War
era. Years later she was cleared of treason, for "[a] wife who left the
country in the company of her husband did not withdraw herself; but
was, if I may so express it, withdrawn by him."5 Since that time, the
federal courts have ruled for dissolution of citizenship when women
4. P. 277 (quoting U.S. District Judge W.D. Murray in United States
Supp. 1060, 1069 (D. Mont. 1975)).
5. P. 30 (quoting Judge Theodore Sedgwick in Martin
392 (1805)).

v.

v.

Reiser, 394 F.

Commonwealth, 1 Mass. 347,
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marry aliens and move away because it is a volitional act.6 While this
change seems to confer respect on women's independent decision
making, it ignores the social reality of marriage, which defines the wife
by the husband's acts.
The historical denial of equal obligations for women was protec
tive in its best light, paternalistic in its worst. For instance, Kerber ob
serves, "Women were understood to be favored by the culture, and
exemption from jury service was understood to be one manifestation
of that privilege."7 As nurturers of the nation, or "republican moth
ers" as the early patriots called them, women were to be protected
from the filth that came before the court.8 This posture actually de
feated some interests in fair judicial proceedings, as when women
committed crimes and sought a jury of their peers. The classic case is
that of Gwendolyn Hoyt, discussed in Chapter Four of the book (p.
124). Hoyt was found guilty of second degree murder for killing her
husband with a baseball bat. She challenged her conviction on appeal,
contending that her constitutional rights were denied by the lack of
(potentially sympathetic) female representation on the jury.9 The
Supreme Court upheld her conviction, concluding that Florida could
permissibly exempt women from jury duty in the interest of the gen
eral welfare because women could reasonably be viewed as "the cen
ter of home and family life."10 This reasoning acted to exclude all
women from such service, regardless of whether they actually had do
mestic obligations.11

6. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). On a related citizenship issue, Kerber
notes that until 1934 a child born abroad was only a birthright citizen if the father was a citi
zen regardless of whether the mother was one - an interesting qualification given the uncer
tainty of paternity as compared to maternity. P. 43.
7. P. 134. Other examples included different female standards in aspects of tort law,
including emotional distress and reasonableness. See generally Martha Chamallas & Linda
K. Kerber, Women, Mothers and the Law ofFright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990);
Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law Courts, 1860-1930, 21 HARV.
WOMEN'S LJ. 79 (1998).
8. Pp. 146-47. Kerber notes that the "republican mother" term initially referred to
women who claimed convictions of which men thought them incapable. However, it came to
refer to women's role in fulfilling househo\d duties as an obligation of citizenry.
9. P. 161. Also, while there was some history of domestic violence, it is unlikely that
Hoyt could have made out a case of self-defense or claimed battered women's syndrome,
had that concept existed at the time. P. 174.
10. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961). In a different case some years earlier, the
Florida Supreme Court had denied mandatory jury service of women, stating, "the spirit of
chivalry, and of deep respect for the rights of the opposite sex, have not yet departed from
the heads and hearts of the men of this country." P. 140 (quoting Hall v. State, 187 So. 392,
401 (Fla. 1939)).
11. Finally, in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the Court ruled that men and
women are equally obligated to serve on juries. The Court did not invalidate the use of per
emptory challenges to screen for gender until 1994. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511
U.S. 127 (1994).
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Kerber documents that in the debates on military service, many
legislators saw women's contribution to the national defense as the
task of "keeping the home fires burning" (p. 249); this despite their of
ten significant wartime role outside the house, such as in industry.12
These rationales acted as a scrim on gender stereotyping. In fact,
women were thought to lack the reason to deliberate on the law in the
jury format (p. 146) and were deemed physically vulnerable in conflict,
making them a liability to the state as soldiers (p. 237). Early feminist
advocates characterized male treatment of women as nothing short of
a plot: "He has endeavored, in every way that he could, to destroy her
confidence in her own powers, to lessen her self-respect, and to make
her willing to lead a dependent and abject life."13
"Relieving" women of the obligations of citizenship, however, also
deprives them of citizenship's opportunities. For example, to the ex
tent that the public looks for military service in the background of its
candidates, denial of combat experience disadvantages politically as
piring women.14 Favoritism quickly becomes discrimination where
gender is concerned.
One would like to think that we are past equal footing being with
held and that to preserve this concern is mere paranoia. But Kerber's
account is in some ways a clarion call. She puts us on guard about how
the law and policy of the modern era may impinge upon women's
rights. Taxation schemes may be the best example of insidious ineq
uity, as "U.S. tax structures continue to combine with social traditions
to sustain a system in which wives are understood to be secondary
earners and their participation in the waged labor force understood to
be a matter of choice."15 As another example, most women still rely
on their relationship to men for obtaining social security benefits, as
most elderly women's subsistence is defined by their husband's work
history.16 In fundamental areas, women are still not recognized as
autonomously fulfilling the tasks and securing the entitlements of citi
zenship.

12. Pp. 261-267 (discussing "women of the army" volunteerism). Motherhood itself was
dressed as an act of citizenship as women risked their lives in birthing future soldiers. P. 244.
13. SHEILA RUTH, ISSUES IN FEMINISM: A FIRST COURSE IN WOMEN'S STUDIES 473-74
(1980) (quoting the Declaration of Sentiments from the Seneca Falls Convention, 1848).
14. P. 260. Kerber also notes that the military's increasingly permissive attitude toward
women in combat may ultimately undermine Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning that
women were not equally obligated to register for the draft because they are not "similarly
situated" to men in their fighting duties. P. 298 (discussing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57,
77-79 (1981)).
15. P. 122. See also EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 236-238 (1997).
16. See Kathleen Feldstein, Social Security's Gender Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1998, at
A27.
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FORECASTING FORECLOSURE OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS
The most useful and fascinating facet of Kerber's work is how pre
dictions foretell the modern status of women. Virtually every tale de
scribes the roots of attitudes, and indeed inequalities, that endure to
day. This is most compelling in the chapter on Reconstruction Era
vagrancy laws.17 The laws were devised to manage the proliferation of
individuals apparently aimless in their newfound freedom. They re
quired individuals to find work, or at least the appearance of self
support. There was a purported obligation not to become a burden on
government and many states initiated compulsory work contracts for
freedpeople (pp. 56-58). As Kerber notes, however, "vagrancy is a
status offense; the crime is not what a person has done, but what a
person appears to be" (p. 54). Under these circumstances, white
women bore little burden of productivity thrust upon them compared
to their African-American counterparts. Furthermore, black women
searching for formerly enslaved husbands and children were often pre
sumed to be prostitutes (p. 59), and were subsequently detained, fined,
imprisoned, and compelled to work. It seems that, unlike white
women, their primary obligation was not to family and home.
All of this would be barely palatable if it were mere artifact, but as
Kerber notes, "Impoverished black women have been caught in the
internal contradictions of a gendered ideology of an obligation to
work that succeeded slavery" (p. 80). The social goals and disparate
burden of the policies she identifies are echoed in today's welfare re
form,18 as poor women (disproportionately minorities) are ordered to
relinquish their primary parental role and work outside the home in
order to receive sustaining benefits. The welfare-to-work scheme re
quires the same "measurable and visible" productivity that early va
grancy laws defined (p. 80). In the light of this "tradition," the welfare
policies framed as fostering family independence feel even more
deeply regressive.19
Kerber ties modern concerns with gender roles in civic participa
tion to their historical mores.20 Again, in her discussion of the draft,
17. Laws adopted by former Confederate states between 1890-1910 stayed on the books
until the 1960s. P. 69.
18. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (enacting work requirements to secure temporary assis
tance for needy families).
19. Another shocking parallel with this chapter's idleness concerns is the reemergence
of loitering ordinances. In 1866 a commentator in the Houston Tri-Weekly Telegraph tar
geted "the black vagrants to be seen on street comers, dressed in the height of fashion, and
who sport their jewelry and gold watches when they have no visible means of support these are the villains we declare war upon." P. 59. Compare this with the discriminatory
presumptions that city policy was based upon in Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)
(holding loitering ordinance restricting activity on city sidewalks void for vagueness).
20. See, e.g., supra note 7.
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Kerber recognizes a trend toward the "valorization" of male violence
first within the military, and then as women were admitted into this
domain, preserved outside the military. She concludes that even with
the services' promotion of womerr, "it is possible to revise even this
most traditional system of gender difference [the military] while at the
same time keeping systems of male domination intact" (p. 301). She
concludes that women as a class have had a distinct experience with
violence and have not been able to count on the state for protection,
most starkly in cases of domestic abuse. It may seem far afield, as
Kerber suggests, that women's differential citizenship requirements being "protected" from military participation, for example - result in
victim status, but it is an interesting speculation (p. 302). Even when
Kerber doesn't mean to, her historical analysis implicates present-day
concerns. For instance, she recognizes that women are characteristi
cally perceived to be more emotional and inclined to mediation (p.
175), which raises persistent questions about the importance of jury
composition21 and the current claims that women are responsible for
hung juries.22 But while she makes clear that the mission is not com
plete, she avoids heavy-handed advocacy. Her stories spur an under
standing of how women ended up where they are, and how far they
have to go.

TEACHING LAW . . .
Readers seeking precise attention to the legal nuances of the cases
from which Kerber generates her stories will be disappointed. It
seems entirely likely that Kerber understands the details of jurispru
dence, for while she is not trained as a lawyer, she is a legal historian.
But Kerber has chosen not to instruct the lay reader on the sometimes
absurd technicalities that seem to constrain justice. Still, she does her
readers a disservice by not explaining the legal standards clearly, ei
ther in the text or in the voluminous notes. There are several exam
ples of Kerber failing to identify the exercise of "passive virtues,"23 the
judicial constructs, such as standing, case and controversy, and ripe
ness that lead to disposition of a case on grounds short of substantive
constitutional resolution. Discussing the statutes that prohibited va
grancy, she notes that some of them were deemed "void for vague21. See MARTHA M!NOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF 15 (1997) ("Should juries be se
lected to mirror the diversity in the population, with individuals representing specific con
stituencies, or should the selection be random, even if particular juries end up with members
who all share a race, a gender, or an ethnic background?").
22. See Jeffrey Rosen, One Angry Woman: Why Are Hung Juries On the Rise?, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 24/March 3, 1997, at 54-55 (arguing that in refusing to convict clearly guilty
individuals, some female jurors' (specifically identified are African-American mothers) ac
tion is tantamount to jury nullification).
23.

See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111 (1962).
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ness" (p. 79), without noting that this is an important test for legisla
tive interpretation, that statutes must be particular enough so that
their precise application can be understood and predicted.24 In the
discussion of male draft registration, Kerber reports that the Justice
Department found no "controversy" (p. 271 ), without acknowledging
that this element is essential to whether the case can be litigated.25
Later in the same discussion, she fails to explain the judicial philoso
phy of deference to the legislature, writing only that in the Supreme
Court, "[t]he dialogue was framed in terms of whether Congress was
being reasonable."26 By not explaining the doctrinal grounds for deci
sions, Kerber confuses the lay reader as to the courts' actual take on
the substantive questions.
In addition to omitting these legally significant details, Kerber
chooses not to explore the dynamics of federalism and separation of
powers as they pertain to the panoply of citizen's rights and obliga
tions. She deals extensively with laws surrounding jury selection and
property disbursement, areas traditionally left to the states, yet gener
ally downplays the significance of state versus federal legal domains.
In a rare exception, she discusses the burden women's advocates faced
in their effort to amend statutory language on female-inclusive jury
service. Due to the fact that jury eligibility was determined by state
law, the advocates were forced to amend the laws state by state in
stead of by mandate of the federal courts (pp. 137-39). Similarly,
Kerber rarely acknowledges the delicate power balance between the
Congress, the executive branch, and the courts. The best example of
this tension in the book is President Carter advocating for a universal
draft registration, while at the same time declining to veto a male-only
draft provision sent up by Congress. Further, the legislative and ex
ecutive actions were concurrent with the relevant test case on univer
sal draft registration, which was proceeding from the appellate to the
Supreme Court (pp. 288-99). Ultimately, the Court found that women
were not required to register and the Congressional agenda went for
ward. Greater acknowledgment of these legal machinations would
bring the challenge of the cases, and their national implications, into
sharper relief.
The omission of these dynamics denies the reader the opportunity
to explore another quandary embedded in the book; namely, if we are
24. For discussion of the vagueness doctrine, see HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 212 (4th ed. 1996). See also Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
25. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1911).
26. P. 297. As another example, Kerber does not explain the importance of showing
intentional discrimination on the part of Massachusetts in setting veteran's hiring prefer
ences, namely that the Fourteenth Amendment requires this to find constitutionally violative
state action. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See also the discussion of veter
ans hiring infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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to establish equality for women, by what means can that goal best be
accomplished? In the past, women may have sought recourse in a de
tached judiciary unbeholden to an electorate dominated by male
power. In contrast, women can more readily push their issues by leg
islative means in today's world where so many votes seem up for grabs
and candidates woo "soccer moms" as an important source of swing
votes. But all of this begs the questions as to whether women can be
defined as a political group at all, and whether issues can be desig
nated uniquely feminine.27 In discussing whether women, as a classifi
cation, deserve special scrutiny under the law, John Hart Ely observes,
"they're not discrete and insular, they're not even a minority! "28 He
argues, "It is true that women do not generally operate as a very cohe
sive political force."29 Still, one hopes that they could, and many
commentators and political analysts assume that they do.30

OR TELLING STORIES
Even if women could act as a unit, it is clear from Kerber's ac
counts that progress has been made largely through personal initiative.
Her intimate narratives highlight individual struggles for group equal
ity. The fight for reversal of hiring preferences for veterans is one
such case. As Kerber notes, women were not absolutely disadvan
taged in the Massachusetts hiring queue at issue in Personnel Admin
istrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.31 The order of preference was
from disabled veterans, wives of disabled ex-servicemen and widows
of deceased ex-servicemen, any veteran, "natural" mothers of men
who had died or been completely disabled in service and who were
themselves divorced or widowed.32 Women found some access to
preference, but based on the traditional categories of marital status
and maternal relationship. Meanwhile, a slew of qualified women
27. As Kerber documents, these questions reach back quite far to the beginning of
women's suffrage. Efforts to reform jury statutes stalled between 1922-1924 because "it be
came clear that women did not vote as a block, and legislators found it less urgent to treat
them as an interest group." P. 139. In some cases, the husband's opinion determined the
wife's vote or the husband simply forbade his wife from going to the ballot box. A similar
dynamic may have been at play on the jury issue, as women generally did not take advantage
of their right to register for ele;:tive jury service. P. 159.
28. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 164 (1980).
29. Id. at 166.
30. See Bob Herbert, Women Vote Too, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2000, at A27; Katha Pollitt,
Dead Again?, THE NATION, July 13, 1998, at 10.
31. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that the vet
eran's preference statute did not deprive women of equal protection of the laws as the pref
erence was for veterans over nonveterans, not men over women).
32. P. 225. Mothers to men born out of wedlock were excluded from the category of
natural mothers. These preferences were also exempted from the purview of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. P. 227.
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seeking civil service positions were displaced by the policy. What
policymakers viewed as an expression of gratitude by a costless reallo
cation of resources actually had a significant impact on the economic
prospects of women.
The lawyers who sought to bring the case reviewed the results of
administrative examinations to find women who had been deprived
opportunities despite outstanding scores. They found that a lot of
women wouldn't talk because they were scared of jeopardizing their
provisional, though not ideal, positions with the state government (p.
231). Helen Feeney of Massachusetts, a long-time civil servant,
stepped forward in an attempt to overturn the hiring preference.
Feeney describes how she felt when she realized she would be the only
plaintiff in the case: "I felt like the cheese in the nursery rhyme, you
know, 'the cheese stands alone.' "33
The means by which women's equality should be pursued provided
fodder for debate among activists. From the very beginning of the
women's movement, splits emerged not only between suffrage advo
cates and nonadvocates, but among advocates themselves (pp. 86-87).
Some women were suspicious of wide-ranging feminist agendas; that
suspicion persists today.34 In the face of this discord, those women
whose stories make law evidence noble strengths.
The solitariness of the mission to vindicate rights and assume obli
gations is also depicted movingly in the portraits of the advocates.
The female lawyers who took up the causes of women were them
selves remarkable for all they overcame. Pauli Murray, who articu
lated the argument that Fourteenth Amendment protections for
women should mirror those for blacks,35 could not use a prestigious
graduate fellowship to study at Harvard Law, as the school had yet to
admit women (pp. 186-88). Raya Dreben pursued the fairness of jury
selection for the accused murderer Gwendolyn Hoyt. Dreben had
graduated high in her class at Harvard Law in 1954, taught at the
University of Chicago Law School and yet could not find a firm to hire
her back in Boston. She was offering part-time, free legal services
when she secured the Hoyt case (pp. 165-67). Most notable is the
33. P. 232. While Kerber does a splendid job depicting champions in isolation, she does
not address the additional emotional burden of having one's life story reduced to legal jar
gon.
34. See, e.g., Phyllis Schlafly, The Radical Goals of the Feminists, THE PHYLLIS ScHAFLY
REPORT, December 1991, at 1 ("The polls are now all reporting that 'feminism' is a negative
word. Women absolutely do not want to be called feminists."); Ginia Bellafante, Feminism:
It's All About Me, TIME, June 29, 1998, at 54, 57 (reporting that among white, college
educated women, the cohort most likely to identify themselves as "feminists," only 53 per
cent embraced the label). For a more thorough account of the attitude, see CHRISTINA
HOFF SOMMERS, WHO STOLE FEMINISM?: How WOMEN HAVE BETRAYED WOMEN
(1994).
35. See Pauli Murray & Mary 0. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination
and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232 (1965).
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story of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who left Harvard Law for Columbia
after experiencing appalling treatment based upon her gender. Dur
ing an annual dinner for the female students hosted by Harvard Law
Dean Erwin Griswold, she was grilled along with other women on why
they were in law school, taking a place that could be occupied by a
man.36 Among other women's rights work, Ginsburg wrote the brief
for the case establishing that discrimination based upon sex was a vio
lation of equal protection.37 Kerber even notes the professional legal
environments in which the early women's rights advocates were
raised, though they had no opportunity of their own to become law
yers; for example, Elizabeth Cady Stanton watched her father's law
practice carefully (p. 83). The stories behind these women's motiva
tion lends great meaning to Kerber's narrative of litigants. It is certain
that the cause of equal citizenship has been significantly bolstered by
women's training in the law and the profession's recognition of them.
MOVING BEYOND FEMINIST THEORY AND RIGHTS DISCOURSE

Kerber's sophisticated scholarship tackles two areas of legal dis
course sorely in need of unifying insight - ideas about citizenship and
feminism. Kerber overcomes the undue focus on rights in modern
constitutional litigation and yokes these entitlements once again to
civic obligations. In her storytelling, Kerber offers historical fact pat
terns to buoy the concerns of feminist legal scholars. But she subli
mates the sameness-difference debate and seeks a basis for equality in
obligation as much as rights.
Kerber acknowledges that "[t]he language of obligation fits un
comfortably into democratic conversation; talk of obligation is as apt
to lead to claims for entitlements as it is to assertions of equal respon
sibility" (p. 223). But we should be grateful that this book is not about
claiming rights nor about gender discrimination per se. In addressing
the much-neglected concept of obligation, the work has a fuller depic
tion of women's citizenship position in mind. As Mary Ann Glendon
has observed, political discourse increasingly focuses on rights, a my
opic view that is destructive "by its starkness and simplicity, its prodi
gality in bestowing the rights label, its legalistic character, its exagger
ated absoluteness, its hyperindividualism, its insularity, and its silence
with respect to personal, civic, and collective responsibilities."38
Kerber's tales demonstrate that the assertion of rights has not always
had the centrality in political discourse that it does today. Indeed,
36. Pp. 201-02. Noting that her husband was in the second-year class, Ginsburg said she
thought it important to understand one's husband's work.
37. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
38. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE x (1991).
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concern for political discourse and its impact on civic sensibilities was
elemental to advocating women's equal citizenship since the time of
John Stuart Mill.39 Women may, in fact, be especially inclined to nur
ture the notion of community upon which citizenship is founded.
Issues born of the modern feminist movement are emblematic of
clashing rights characterizing social controversy.40
National polls
demonstrated that a substantial majority of those who supported tradi
tional women's roles also supported the ERA.41 This finding led one
scholar to observe, "[t]he explanation for these figures is quite simple:
Americans can favor abstract rights even when they oppose substan
tive change."42 This devotion to rights is exactly what Kerber counter
points with her work. She shows that a grant of rights is accompanied
by obligations that necessarily implicate women's traditional roles. In
going beyond discussion of the liberal democratic ideals of women's
rights, Kerber answers a scholarly call for attention to the historical
experience of civic life.43 As Kerber observes, "American political
theory has traditionally had much to say about rights and little about
obligation" (p. xxi). Particularly in the case of women, it must be em
phasized that rights have often not gone hand in hand with civic
equality.44
While not so sexy as vindicating rights, duties sometimes offered
unexplored leverage to women seeking equal citizenship. "Obliga
tions were hard to dramatize. Women could not refuse to serve on ju
ries, since no one asked them. Women could not refuse militia service,
since no one asked them. But women could refuse to pay taxes . . . "
(p. 98). Kerber is precise in her articulation of obligation - she is re
ferring not to voluntary civic service but to compulsory duties, for
which the failure to perform will be punished by the state (p. xxi).
Such obligations have historically run to a sentiment of patriotism
among the populace - women needed to assume these obligations to

be legitimized in their allegiance. And sometimes refusing to fulfill
obligation was tantamount to a sort of civil disobedience in the strug
gle for social equality. Without possessing duties to eschew, women
were at a considerable disadvantage in claiming rights.
Having presented women's unique imbalance with regard to con
stitutional obligations and rights, Kerber runs head-on into the debate

39. P. 99. See also JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (M.I.T. Press
1970) (1869).
40. See, for example, Laurence Tribe's characterization in ABORTION: THE CLASH OF
THE ABSOLUfES {1990).
41. See JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 22 (1986).
42 Id.
43. See ROGERS M. SMITH, CMC !DEALS 11 (1997).
44. See id. at 386.
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over sex equality. Summarizing the issue, Catharine MacKinnon
writes, "A built-in tension exists between this concept of equality,
which presupposes sameness, and this concept of sex, which presup
poses difference."45 She adds, "[M]en's differences from women are
equal to women's differences from men. There is an equality there."46
Women have often had to stress differences to make their case for
rights and obligations. Advocating simultaneously for the right of citi
zens to an impartial jury and the obligation of citizens to serve on ju
ries is perhaps the best example (p. 136). Arguments seesawing be
tween sameness and difference of the genders permeated debates on
these policies. If women were the same as men they were not needed
to provide breadth to juries; if they were different could they possibly
lack the rational ability for this sort of deliberation? But as Kerber
notes, "Like the White Queen in Through the Looking Glass, sup
porters of women's jury service were capable of thinking of two con
tradictory things before breakfast" (p. 145). Despite much debate
about "separate but equal" as it pertains to race, difference and
equality seemed to be incompatible concepts in the instance of gender,
at least in the eyes of men sitting on judicial benches.47 Ultimately,
however, the Supreme Court approved of the difference contention
where juries were concerned, even if in a somewhat backhanded way.
Justice Douglas wrote in Ballard, "the two sexes are not fungible . . . .
[A] flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded."48 Pre
sumably this "flavor" was distinctive experience, perspective, and wis
dom.
In light of this insecure balance, it makes sense to refrain from
dogmatic group definitions in the law. As Martha Minow argues, we
can alleviate group burdens without erasing characteristics distin
guishing the group.49 Translated to gender, we can acknowledge the
special challenges women face in gaining equality without purging
them of their characteristic femininity. The view in 1997 from our na
tion's highest court presents a similar best-case scenario that embraces
difference among genders while preserving equality.
As Justice
Ginsburg wrote for the majority in United States v. Virginia,

45. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 33 (1987).
46. Id. at 37. MacKinnon ultimately opts for assessment of equality not based on gender
distinctions, but on dominance models.
47. Kerber highlights this inconsistency by pointing out that sex, like race, is immutable.
But the reality was "if the members of the Warren Court generally were certain that dis
crimination on the basis of race was not equal treatment under the law - that you could not
have difference and equality at the same time - they were not at all certain that discrimina
tion on the basis of sex was equally questionable." P. 172.
48. P. 150. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946).
49. See MAR1HA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION
AND AMERICAN LAW 86 (1990).
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" 'Inherent differences' between men and women, we have come to
appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's
opportunity."50 While she doesn't explicitly endorse this articulation,
the trajectory of Kerber's consideration would indicate her support.
In presenting both sides of citizenship, obligation with rights,
Kerber describes a purer form of liberty for the American woman. In
his explication of positive freedom Isaiah Berlin said,
I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active
being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by
references to my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I
believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to re
alize that it is not.51

This ability not to have one's rights interfered with, nor one's obliga
tions differently calibrated, is the essence of what we women have
sought.

CONCLUSION
My childhood friends tell the story of how, in the first grade, I one
day seized a rear seat of the school bus, a domain generally taken by
the boys. When challenged for my occupation, my comeback was a
resounding, "It's a free country." It was also about this time, 1978,
that I began advocating for the Equal Rights Amendment among my
peers at the neighborhood pool. I guess I was a weird kid. But even
at this young age, I had a clear conception that I should have equal
civic standing with men, while at the same time, I knew that this parity
had been, and continued to be, elusive. Not much has changed in my
mind over the past two decades. I assume a posture of presumption
about my equality, even as I remain vigilant in reinforcing this status.
One is left simultaneously awed and dismayed upon completion of
Kerber's accourit of women's citizenship, come of age.
"In the
founding era the manikin of the body politic on which the suit of rights
and obligations was fitted was explicitly male" (p. 218). Now at least
women are heard when they make a play to be the model for the
badges of citizenship. This century's astounding progress of women
towards equal footing at home, in school and in the workplace is un
deniable. But we will do well to remember that progress in the law is
not the end-all and be-all of achieving social equality. Kerber is clear

50. 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). It is worth noting that other scholars have disavowed the
sameness-difference argument, though with different emphases. Catharine MacKinnon, for
instance, asserts, "[C]onsidering gender a matter of sameness and difference covers up the
reality of gender as a system of social hierarchy, as an inequality." CATHARINE
MAC.KINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF STATE 218 (1989).
51. ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR EsSAYS ON LIBERTY 131 (1969).
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that women's desire to be different, while equal, remains an intracta
ble challenge for law and society.

